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THE NEW YORK WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW.
By MAURICE J.

O'CALLAGHAN,

bf the New York Bar.

Despite the fact that this law has been upon our statute books
for nearly three years; that it has been reviewed and upheld by
our highest courts, includink the Supreme Court of the United
States ;' and that more than one hundred and twenty thousand
cases have been determined under its provisions, a great body of
the public at large and even many members of the Bar are unfamiliar, not merely with its terms, but even with its theory and its
principles. Yet this is not surprising, for the character of this legislation is so novel and so revolutionary, when compared with all previous rules of common law regarding the relation of master and
servant. But covering, as this new law does, the business life of the
whole community and being a necessary part of the operation of
every important business conducted within the state, it is hardly
possible for any of us to escape, for any considerable period of
time, coming upon the Workmen's Compensation Law, in one
way or another.
For many years prior to the enactment of this law it was
realized that the development of modern business conditions had

rendered the old common law doctrines, applicable to the relation
of master and servant, inequitable. The whole theory of employers' liability for negligence, with its defenses of contributory
negligence, fellow servant's negligence and assumption of risk, is
based upon fictions invented by the Courts from time to time in
days gone by, and is inapplicable to the modern conditions of employment. In the highly organized and hazardous industries of
the present day, the causes of accident are often so obscure and
complex that in a material proportion of cases it is impossible, by
any method, correctly to ascertain the facts necessary to form an
accurate judgment, and, in a still larger proportion, the expense
and delay required for such ascertainment, amount, in effect, to a
defeat of justice. Under the old system, the injured workmen was
left to bear the greater part of the industrial accident loss alone,
which, because of his limited income, he was unable to sustain, so
that he and those dependent upon him were overcome by poverty
and became a burden upon public or private charity. Litigation was
'N. Y. C. R. R. Co. v. White, U. S. Supreme Court, March 6, 1917;

except as to cases arising under admiralty jurisdiction, Jenks v. Southern
Pacific Co., U. S. Supreme Court, May 21, 1917.
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costly and tedious, encouraging corrupt practices and arousing antagonism between employers and employees.'
The reformation of these conditions became the object of much
serious thought and study, and the attention of our leaders and
legislators, in search for a betterment of this condition, was di-.
rected to the principles of what is known as Workmen's Compensation Insurance, prevailing in many countries abroad. While
comparatively new in this country, the nations of the Old World
had, in several instances, adopted this system many years ago.
It is based upon an analysis of the relations existing between
master and servant. The situation has been described in the White
case, supra, like this: employer and employee by mutual consent
engage in a common operation intended to be advantageous to both;
the employee is to contribute his personal services, and for these is
to receive wages, and, brdinarily, nothing more; the employer is to
furnish plant, facilities, organization, capital, credit, is to control and
nianage the operation, paying the wages and other expenses, disposing of the product at such prices as he can obtain, taking all the
profits, if any there be, and, of necessity, bearing the entire loss. In
the nature of things there is more or less of a probability that the
employee may lose his life through some accidental injury arising
out of the employment, leaving his widow or children deprived of
their natural support; or that he may sustain an injury, not mortal,
but resulting in his total or partial disablement, temporary or
permanent, with a corresponding impairment of earning capacity.
The physical suffering must be borne by the employee alone;
nature itself prevents this from being evaded or shifted to another,
and the law makes no attempt to afford an equivalent in compensation. But, besides, there is the loss of earning power; a loss of
that which stands to the employee as his capital in trade. This is a
loss arising out of the business, and, however it may be charged
up, is an expense of the operation as truly as the cost of repairing
broken machinery or any other expense that ordinarily is paid by
the employer. Who is to bear the charge? It is plain, that, on the
grounds of natural justice, it is not unreasonable for the state, while
relieving the employer from responsibility for damages measured
by common law standards and payable in cases where he or those
for whose conduct he is answerable are found to be at fault, to
require him to contribute a reasonable amount, and according to a
reasonable and definite scale, by way of compensation for the loss
of earning power incurred in the common enterprise, irrespective
2N. Y. C. R. R. Co. v. White, U. S. Supreme Court, March 6, 1917.
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of the question of negligence, instead of leaving the entire loss to
rest where it may chance to fall-that is, upon the injured employee or his dependents.
A commission was appointed in 1909 by the Legislature of the
State of New York to examine into and report upon labor conditions in the state, and dtfe to the very valuable work of this
commission, more than any other agency, workmen's compensation
was written into our judicial system. The first Workmen's Compensation Law was declared unconstitutional," but in December,
1913, the adoption of an amendment to the Constitution, expressly
permitting the Legislature to enact such a law, paved the way for
the present statute, which took effect in July, 1914.
The Workmen's Compensation Law of New York, to use Mr.
Justice Pitney's analysis, establishes forty-two groups of hazardous
employments; defines "employee" as a person engaged in one of
these employments upon the premises or at the plant or in the
course of his employment away from the plant of his employer,
but excluding farm laborers and domestic servants; defines
"employment" as including employment only in a trade, business or occupation 'carried on by the employer for pecuniary
gain, "injury" and "personal injury" as meaning only accidental
injuries arising out of and in the course of employment, and
such disease or infection as naturally and unavoidably may
result therefrom; and requires every employer, subject to its provisions, to pay or provide compensation according to a prescribed
schedule for the disability or death of his employee resulting from
an-accidental personal injury arising out of and in the course of
the employment, without regard to fault as a cause, except where
the injury is occasioned by the willful intention of the injured
employee to bring about the injury, or death of himself or of another, or where it results solely from the intoxication of the injured employee while on duty, in which cases neither the injured
employee nor any dependent shall receive compensation. By
section 11, the prescribed liability is made exclusive, except that,
if an employer fail to secure the payment of compensation as provided in section 50, an injured employee, or his legal representative
in case death results from the injury, may at his option elect to
claim compensation under the Act or to maintain an action in the
courts for damages, and in such an action it shall not be necessary
to plead or prove freedom from contributory negligence, nor may
the defendant plead as a defense that the injury was caused by the
*Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 201 N. Y. 271.
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negligence of a fellow servant, that the employee assumed the risk
of this employment, or that the injury was due to contributory
negligence. Compensation under the Act is not regulated by the
measure of damages applied in negligence suits, but in addition to
providing medical, surgical, or other like treatment, it is based
solely on loss of earning power, being graduated according to the
average weekly wages of the injured employee and the character
and duration of the disability, whether partial or total, temporary
or permanent; while in case the injury causes death the compensation is known as a death benefit, and includes funeral expenses not
exceeding one hundred dollars, payments to the surviving wife (or
dependent husband) during widowhood (or dependent widowerhood) of a percentage of the average wages of the deceased, and
if there be a surviving child or children under the age of eighteen
years an additional percentage of such wages for each child until
that age is reached. There are provisions invalidating agreements
by employees to waive the right to compensation, prohibiting any
assignment, release, or commutation of claims for compensation
or benefits, except as provided by the Act, exempting them from
the claims of creditors, and requiring that the compensation and
benefits shall be paid only to employees or their dependents. Provision is made for the establishment of a Workmen's Compensation Commission 4 with administrative and judicial functions, including authority to pass upon claims to compensation, on notice
to the parties interested. The award or decision of the commission is made subject to an appeal, on questions of law only, to the
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court for the Third Department, with an ultimate appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases
where such an appeal would lie in civil actions. By section 50,
each employer is required to secure compensation to his employees
in one of the following ways: (1) by insuring and keeping insured
the payment of such compensation in the state fund; or (2)
through any stock corporation or mutual association authorized to
transact the business of workmen's compensation insurance in the
state; or (3) by furnishing satisfactory proof to the commission
of his financial ability to pay such compensation for himself. If
an employer fails to comply with this section he is made liable to a
penalty in an amount equal to the pro rata premium that would
have been payable for insurance in the state fund, during the period
of non-compliance; besides which, his injured employees or their
'Now the State Industrial Commission.
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dependents are at liberty to maintain an action for damages in
the courts, as prescribed by section 11.
The practice under the law is verysimple, and, as a matter of
fact, every effort is made to make the proceedings for the payment of compensation as informal, easy and expeditious as possible. When an employee is injured and his disability exceeds
fourteen days, for which period no compensation is allowed under
the law, if he desires to avail himself of his right to compensation
he files with his employer a claim for compensation for the injury.
The injury itself he must have reported in writing within ten days
after the accident5 and the law requires the employer to report
to the State Industrial Commission all injuries sustained by his
employees, whether claims for compensation are made for them or
not. After the claim has been made by the employee to his employer, if the employer admits the justice and legality of the claim,
he can enter into an agreement with his employee under the terms
of which the employee is paid compensation at the rate of two-thirds
of his regular weekly wages until the termination of the period of
disability. In the case of a loss of certain members, such as an
arm, hand, or foot, etc., the law itself provides a specific number
of weeks to which the employee is entitled for the loss of such
member. The employer is also obliged to provide, if requested by
the employee, whatever medical attention is necessary, for a period
of sixty days following the date of the accident.
If the employer does not admit the propriety of his employee's
claim for compensation and refuses to enter into the agreement
mentioned above, the employee then has recourse to the State Industrial Commission and he presents a sworn notice to the Commission of the facts of the accident and the nature of his injury and
the matter is then placed before the Commissiori for a hearing to
determine whether or not the claim is a compensatable one, of
which hearing both employer and employee are given notice and at
which both are allowed to introduce whatever evidence they may
have to offer. The Commission then makes its ruling. The vast
majority of cases are not heard by the State Industrial Commissiofi but by deputy commissioners presiding over different districts into which the state is divided, but if a case is of a peculiar
nature or presents intricate or novel questions, a hearing may be
had before the Commission itself. The same is also true where a
party feels aggrieved by the decision of a deputy commissioner,
'But theCommission has power to excuse failure to give notice, and

usually does.

See, however, Bloomfield v. November, 219 N. Y. 374.
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in which case he may succeed in inducing the Commission to reopen the claim, hear further proof or argument, and perhaps set
aside the action of the deputy commissioner.
From the decision of the Commission, an appeal lies to the
Third Department of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court,
sitting in Albany. An appeal is taken by filing a notice of appeal
within thirty days after a copy of the decision of the Commission
is sent to the party.
According to the usual practice in appeals at law the appellant
must prepare and serve the record on appeal, which contains the
papers and testimony upon which the Commission acted in making
its decision, and also a copy of the decision of the Commission
and the notice of appeal. Appeals in workmen's compensation
cases have a priority over all other cases on the court's calendar
and an adjudication of the question involved can be speedily obtained. The Attorney-General is the attorney of record for the
State Industrial Commission and represents the Commission before
the court and defends its action. An appeal to the Court of Appeals from the decision of the Appellate Division is regulated by
the provisions regarding appeals to that Court in the ordinary actions for negligence.
The theory and provisions of this law being unlike any other
known to our jurisprudence, and of such recent origin, it has
fallen to the lot of the Commission and the courts to blaze
the way in the interpretation of the law, as to its meaning and
its application to different situations. Not every business enterprise comes within the purview of the act and it is a very
close question sometimes to decide whether or not a particular business is a hazardous one, such as the act contemplates, or not. Nor is every accident sustained by an employee, while engaged in a hazardous business, compensatable under
the law. The law provides that the injury must be an accidental
one and must have arisen out of and in the course of the employment. Whether or not the injury is an accidental one; whether or
not, under certain circumstances, it arose out of the employment, or
in the course of the employment, it is very difficult to determine,
in many instances. What is meant by "employment" under the
act, and in relation thereto, who is an "employer" and who is an
"employee" are also points, which, in many cases, have given rise to
grave doubts as to the precise interpretation of the act, and have
led to many interesting and sometimes conflicting decisions.
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According to the Workmen's Compensation Law" an injuiy
most be "an accidental injury" and 7 "an accidental personal injury". These are not defined in the .law. The State Industrial
Commission, however, has drawn upon the British Workmen's
Compensation decisions for the definition of an accident and has
held it to be "an unlooked for mishap or untoward event which is
not expected or designed." The element of time also enters into
the determination of whether a particular injury is accident or not.
So, if the injury develops slowly it can hardly be held to be
expected and, therefore, is not an accidental one. For instance: a
flying splinter may instantly destroy the vision of one employee;
work in poor light may gradually blind another. The former
would be an accidental injury, the latter not. Disease resulting
from an accident is compensatable but not an accident resulting
from a disease. 9
The accidental injuries for which workmen receive compensation must arise out of and in the course of their employment.' 0 The
difficulty here is just where and when, as a man quits work at night
or comes to work in the morning, does employment cease and begin; and what are the natural and proper hazards of his employment.
The Workmen's Compensation Commission decided that the
dependents of a 'street railway motorman who, having finished his
day's run, was mortally injured by an automobile while hurrying
from the carbarn to catch one of the company's cars to the city to
get his watch tested in accordance with the company's rules, was
entitled to compensation. The Appellate Division, in reversing
this award, pointed out that the employee had ceased his hazardous
occupation of motorman, had signed his name to the register as
indicative that his day's work was over, had passed out of the
carbarn and had reached the middle of the public highway when he
was struck by the automobile. The court said that the immediate
errand upon which he was bent, having his watch tested in accordance with the company's rules, was not an incident, but a
condition, of his employment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the Appellate Division."
'Sec. 3, sub. 7, W. C. L.
'Sec. 10, W. C. L.

'Yume vs. Knickerbocker Portland,Cement Co., 3 S.D. R. 353.
'Collins vs. Brooklyn Gas Co., 171 App. Div. 381.

"Sec. 3, subs. 4 and 7; sec. 10, W. C. L.

'Devoe v. N. Y. State Rys., 169 App. Div. 472; aff'd 218 N. Y. 318;
see also Berg vs. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 173 App. Div. 82;
Hotalling v. Standard Oil Co., 6 S. D. R. 308.
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Even assuming that an employee is engaged in the service of
his employer at the time of his injury, it is often very difficult to
determine whether or not the accident sustained by him can be
said to arise "out of" the employment. In that connection the rule
is frequently stated:
"An injury is received "inthe course of' the employment when it comes while the workman is doing the duty
which he is employed to perform. It arises 'out of' the employment when there is apparent to the rational mind, upon
consideration of all the circumstances, a casual connection
between the conditions under which the work is required to
be performed and the resulting injury. Under this test, if
the injury can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of the work and to have been contemplated by a reasonable person familiar with the whole situation as a result
of the exposure occasioned by the nature of the employment, then it 'arises out of' the employment. But it excludes an injury which cannot be fairly traced to the employment as a contributing proximate cause and which
comes from a hazard to which the workman would have
been equally exposed apart from the employment, The
causative danger must be peculiar to the work, and not common to the neighborhood. It must be incidental to the
character of the business, and not independent of the relation of master and servant. It need not to have been foreseen or expected, but after the event it must appear to have
had its origin in the risk connected with the employment,
and to have flowed from that source as a rational consequence."
Albert Gleisner was janitor of an apartment building, in which
general capacity he occasionally repaired its plumbing, covered its
pipes with asbestos, did painting and carpentry jobs and operated
its steamheating boiler. These enumerated tasks were hazardous
under the Workmen's Compensation Act. However, he fell and
broke his leg while mounting a ladder on his way to the roof to
hang out a flag. While the task of hanging a flag was incidental
to his occupation as janitor, it was not incidental to his plumbing
and carpentry or other special hazardous tasks, and the injury
sustained by him therefore in this respect did not come under the
law.

12

A carpenter sent to install machinery in a tannery complained
of being ill. An employee of the tannery indicated to him the
place of storage of some Epsom salts. By mistake for the salts,
'Gleisner v. Gross & Herbener, 170 App. Div. 37.
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he took a deadly poison and died in an hour. His widow presented a claim to the Commission under the Compensation Law
and an award was made by that body. The Appellate Division
affirmed the award, but the Court of Appeals reversed it upon the
ground that "assuming that this occurrence constituted an accident
under the act and that it arose in the course of decedent's employment, we are entirely unable to see that it 'arose out of his
employment'. * * * Decedent's illness, and his attempt to
minister thereto, were not ordinary and natural incidents to his
13
employment."'
A very famous case arising under the New York Workmen's
Compensation Law is that of DeFillippis vs. Faikenberg.1" In
that case the claimant, a fifteen-year-old factory girl, lost the use
of an eye by the sportive scissors thrust of a girl co-employee.
The court held that while the accident arose "in the course of"
it did not "arise out of" her employment. "The injury resulted
solely from the sportive act of a co-worker who was in no way
representing the master and which act in no way grew out of, or
was connected with, the employment." The opinion of Mr. Justice Lyon is very interesting in its exhaustive examination of the
law on the question of what accidents are to be construed as arising out of the employment. During the course of his argument,
he refers to many decisions of the British courts under their
Workmen's Compensation Law, and, incidentally, he holds that
the decisions of those courts, in construing the sections of their
law, which are similar to ours, are quite pertinent and instructive,
in interpreting our own act.
It has frequently been held, however, that injuries sustained
by employees as the result of an assault by a fellow employee, or
a third party, are compensatable, provided the assault is connected
in some way with the master's business; but not otherwise. In
Cowen vs. Cowen's New Shirt Laundry,5 the manager of the
laundry was shot by an employee whom he had discharged. The
shooting took place eight months after the murderer had been
dismissed from the employment. An award of compensation was
denied in this case by the Commission, with the unanimous approval of the Appellate Division.
But where the assault is provoked through some act done in
the furtherance of the master's business, compensation should be
allowed.
"O'Neil v. Carle Heater Co., 21g N. Y. 414.
'170 App. Div. 153; aff'd, no opinion, 219 N. Y. 581.
"Appellate Division, December 26, 1916.
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A policeman employed by a mining company was stabbed to
death by a man whom he had arrested at the request of a coemployee. The Commission's award of compensation 16 was affirmed
by the Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals. Also, in
the case of a foreman attacked by two subordinates whom he had
reprimanded for poor work, the Commission's award of compensation for disability due to the injuries so received, 7 was affirmed
by the Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals; as was
likewise the decision of the Commission, making an award in
favor of a workman crippled in a fight with two discharged employees, whose places he had taken.18
"Employment" and in connection therewith, what is meant by
"employer" are also fruitful sources for disputes and close decisions under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The act defines
"employment" as employment only in a trade, business or occupation carried on by the employer for pecuniary gain,19 and, therefore, injuries to employees of private individuals, clubs, societies,
etc., whose objects have no connection with pecuniary gain, are
not compensatable. So it was that until a recent amendment of
the law, employees of the state and of municipalities were not
included within the provisions of the law.
One of the most important decisions under the Act was made
in a case arising under this section. The alleged employer was
engaged in the manufacture of macaroni, one of the employments
enumerated as hazardous in the Workmen's Compensation Law.
The alleged employee was a carpenter and builder, employed by
the macaroni company to make certain alterations in its factory
building. While making such alterations, he was killed by a collapse of the building. His dependents presented a claim under
the law for death benefits to the Commission, which made an
award. On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed the award,
in an exceedingly interesting and illuminating opinion, written by
Mr. Justice Kellogg. 0 He writes: "A judge, who hires an ordinary carpenter to come to
his office or house and put in a new window, is not engaged
in a hazardous business under the law. 'Employment' is
defined by subdivision 5 of section 3 of the law to include
'employment only in a trade, business or occupation carried
James vs. Witherbee, Sherman & Co., 2 S. D. R. 483.
'7 Yumc vs. Knickerbocker Portland Cement Co., 3 S. D. R. 353.
"Harnett vs. Steam Building Co., 2 S.D. R. 492. See also the valuable
opinion of Pound, J., in Heitz vs. Ruppert, 21- N. Y. 148.
"Sec. 3, sub. 5, W. C. L.
'Bargey vs. Massaro Macaroni Co., 170 App. Div. 103.
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on by the employer for pecuniary gain.' If the employer
in a hazardous business uses his employees in doing something which may not be a hazardous employment in itself,
but the work is a part of his general employment and incidental to it, we may well say that the employee received
the injury while engaged in a hazardous employment. But
where a man engages a carpenter by the hour to do some
work upon his premises in the way of improvements, I cannot feel that he is engaged in the hazardous employment of
structural carpentry or repair of buildings as contemplated
by group 42 of section 2 of the Workmen's Compensation
Law."
The case was also reviewed by the Court of Appeals, and the
action of the Appellate Division sustained.21 There, Mr. Justice
Collin, speaking for the Court, said:
"The determination of the question here, through the
application of these provisions (of the Workmen's Compensation Law) is not difficult. The Company was an employer because it employed men in a hazardous employment, to wit, preparing macaroni, a food-stuff. Bargey,
the deceased, was not an employee because he was not engaged in the preparation of macaroni. The placing of the
partition (in which he was engaged) was not an adjunct
of or within the department of employment of preparing
macaroni. It was a specific act for which Bargey was
specially employed, which had no relation to the hazardous employment except that it made more useful within
the contemplation of the employer the building in which
the employment was carried on. He was not engaged in
the preparation of macaroni, even as in partitioning off a
part of the residence of a physician as a professional office,
he would not be engaged in the occupation of practicing
medicine. He was not, within the intendment of the law,
an employee of the company."
These decisions are in entire harmony with the purpose and
spirit of the Compensation Law. The theory of the law is not
one of damages, to which the old principles of common law or
employers' liability acts apply, according to the repeated declarations of the courts, but is based upon the economic principle that
the cost of workmen's injuries, due to the hazards of a particular
business, is to be borne by that business.
Sometimes, a workmen has, apparently, two employers and it
becomes the duty of the Commission and the Court to determine
which of the two is liable for compensation. Here, it would seem,
the Court has fallen into serious error.
21218 N. Y. 410.
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The first case that arose under the Workmen's Compensation
Law on this question was the case of Gimber vs. Kane.22 In that
case, Gimber was employed generally by one party and hired by
him, with a wagon and team, to Kane and while so employed was
injured. The Commission made an award against Kane and,
after appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed the award upon the
authority of Miller vs. North Hudson Contracting Co. 23 An examination of the case of Miller vs. North Hudson will show that
it was not one arising under the Workmen's Compensation Law
but one at law arising under the Employers' Liability Act. In it
it was held that where the contractor hires teams and drivers from
another and places them under the exclusive control and authority
of its foreman, the relation of master and servant exists between
the contractor and the drivers of the teams hired, within the meaning of the Labor Law, rendering the contractor liable for negligence resulting in injury to a driver. It therefore seemed, after
the decision in the Gimber case, that cases similar to that case
were to be governed by that line of cases at common law in which
Miller vs. North Hudson was included. It was not, however, to
remain so for any great length of time. The very next case decided by the Appellate Division established a new course. In Dale
vs. Saunders2 4 the facts were as follows:
Saunders Brothers, alleged employers, were engaged as manufacturers of brick. They employed a number of teamsters to
drive their wagons and from time to time Saunders Brothers furnished these teams with drivers to one Patrick Walsh, who conducted a sand bank for the purpose of delivering sand to patrons.
Dale was one of the teamsters so employed and was sent by
Saunders Brothers to Walsh for the purpose of performing this
delivery service for Walsh. The team and wagon were placed
by the servants and employees of Walsh, and while Dale was engaged in shoveling sand into the wagon, the sand from the bank
caved in, killing Dale. Although the facts in this case were admittedly the same as in the Gimber case the Workmen's Compensation Commission made an award directly opposite to its
award in the Gimber case and held the general employer liable for
the compensation. This contradictory position was made a point
on appeal and the Appellate Division cut the Gordian knot by
holding that the injured man was engaged in two hazardous em'155 N. Y. Supp. 1109.
'166 App. Div. 348.
171 App. Div. 528.
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ployments, and that both the general and the special employers
were liable for the compensation, and strange to say, straightaway affirmed the award against the one of them whom the Commission had previously decided to make liable. On the appeal of
this case, 25 the Court of Appeals, first of all disregarded the
holding of the Appellate Division, in the Gimber case. Mr. Justice Pound, writing the opinion of the Court said :26
"In negligence cases the question often arises as to the
proper application of the doctrine of respondeat superior
when an employee whose negligence causes an accident is
at the time in the general pay and service of one and under
the control and direction of another. The latter has been
held liable as a special employer when it could be said that
the employee was his servant at the time of the accident
in a sense and degree which served to impose liability for
negligence.
(Higgins vs. Western Union Telegraph Co.,
156 N. Y. 75; Howard vs. Ludwig, 171 N. Y. 507). The
question, who is the master, also arises at times in employees' actions for negligent injuries. But the question in
this case is not one of responsibility for negligent injury
inflicted upon strangers nor upon an employee. The doctrine of respondeat superior has no application here,
nor are the rules of employers' liability for negligence
controlling."
In its decision the Court of Appeals also disregarded the reasoning of the Appellate Division that both the general employer and
the special employer were liable in that the injured man was engaged in two employments. The Court said :27
"Saunders Bros. carried on the business of trucking for
pecuniary gain. No claim is made that Walsh was carrying on the business of trucking for pecuniary gain. Dale
was working for Saunders Bros. as a teamster when he
met the accident that caused his death. He was engaged
in teaming, not in 'the operation of a sand pit'. (Workmen's Compensation Law, sec. 2, group 19). The duties
of a teamster properly include the loading of his wagon,
and are not limited to the driving of the team. (Matter
of Costello vs. Taylor, 217 N. Y. 179).",
Immediately after, the same Court had before it the case of
Nolan vs. Cranford Company.28 The situation therein was exaetly
the same as in the Gimber case which had never reached the Court
=218 N. Y. 59.
62.
"At
page 63.
'At page
"219 N. Y. 581.
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of Appeals. Nolan Was generally employed by John Kane. Cranford Company hired certain teams, tricks and drivers from Kane
and among them was Nolan. While driving his truck, with a load
of dirt for the Cranford Company, he was injured and killed. A
claim was presented by his widow to the Commission against the
Cranford Company, and the Commission made an award against
that company. This award was sustained by both the Appellate
Division and the Court of Appeals, without opinion, on the authority of the Miller vs. North Hudson case. It would therefore seem
that the Court of Appeals disregarded the theory, propounded by
it in the Saunders case, that the proper test to determine who was
the employer was the test! to the hazards of what business is the
injury due? It should also be noted that the Courts have followed
the rule of the common law in determining the Gimber and Nolan
cases, in direct contradiction of their frequently expressed principle that cases arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act
were to be determined without reference to either the principles
or the decisions in common law cases.
The theory, followed by the Court of Appeals in the Saunders
case, but disregarded in its other decisions, dovetails nicely into
the scheme of the Workmen's Compensation Law. Apply it to the
Nolan case, for example. Kane, the truckman, the owner of a truck
and team and general employer of the employee, Nolan, would
stand the loss if his wagon broke down or was destroyed; he would
stand the loss if his horse fell, broke a leg and had to be shot; he
would stand the loss if his harness burned. Then why should
not he stand the loss if his man, the driver of the truck and team,
should meet with an accident? Is there any difference in principle under the Compensation Law in these losses, and should
they not all be charged up against the operating expenses of his
business as a truckman? Or is the ttuckman to be excused from
all liability of this act,-despite the fact that he comes within the
provisions of the act enumerating hazardous employments? The
truckman is paid for the hiring of a team, truck and man and'can
charge the operating expense, which includes the cost of workmen's
compensation insurance, up to the hirer, just the same as any other
person engaged in a hazardous business must charge to the cost of
production his expenses and get an increased price for his goods.
Cranford Company, the hirers, are in precisely the same situation
as the purchaser and consumer of goods from a manufacturer. It
paid Kane for the services that Kane rendered it and included
in that payment was an amount to pay for the increased burdens.
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laid by the Workmen's Compensation Act upon Kane, and we
are confronted with the fact, that, if the Cranford Company is liable to Nolan for compensation, it is in the position of having paid
for his compensation twice. The compensation that is paid to a
disabled workman, or to his dependents when he is killed, is, under
the theory of the act, to take the place, and be in lieu, of the wages
of the workman. It therefore requires no great stretch of the
imagination to assume that the logical place from which the compensation should come is the same source from which the wages
are paid.
The Cranford Company was at no time liable for the wages of
Nolan. Had Nolan at any time not been paid his week's wages
his remedy would have been solely against Kane. Yet, Nolan
killed or disabled, the Commission and the Courts determine that
the Cranford Company, and not Kane, is liable for his compensation. That the person or corporation that pays the wage is the
person or corporation that should be liable for the compensation,
is certainly a common sense rule and the only rule really in accord
with the theory and principles of the Compensation Law. As it
has often been pointed out, the principle of compensation is to
make each business bear the cost of the injuries due to the hazards of that business. It would seem clear that since these claimants have been injured or killed on account of the hazards of
trucking, which under the Act is a hazardous employment, the cost
of these injuries should be borne by the business of trucking.
There is no satisfactory solution of the difficulties arising in this
connection as yet, and each new claim becomes in turn a fresh
lawsuit.
The Commission and the Courts have now wrestled vainly with
this troublesome problem for nearly three years and the only remedy, it is suggested, lies in legislative action. That was the remedy adopted by Great Britain and we would do well to follow her
example. In that jurisdiction the definition of employer in the
Workmen's Compensation Act29 contains the following:
"Where the services of a workman are temporarily lent
or let on hire to another person by a person with whom the
workman has entered into a contract of service or apprenticeship, the latter shall, for the purposes of this Act, be
deemed to continue to be the employer of the workman
whilst he is working for that other person."
'6 Edw. VII, Ch. 58, Sec. 13.
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This provision expressly covers the situation which confronts
us in this State. It is a fair and equitable solution and one in perfect accord with the compensation theory. It relieves the special
employer from the burden of paying the workman twice as he has
been forced to do by our courts, as pointed out above; it reiterates
the principle that each business must bear the cost of the injuries
due to the hazards of that business; and it logically taxes for compensation that source from which the' workman's wages come.30
'°It had been the author's purpose to have reviewed further aspects of
the Workmen's Compensation Law in the next issue of the Rswnxw for this
year, but while this number was in press it was determined by the editors,
as expressed elsewhere herein, to close the RmEw with this number.

